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A Digital Wallet that respects your privacy


The European Digital Identity will allow EU citizens, residents, and businesses to identify themselves, access digital services, and digitally sign documents through a Digital ID. Using a digital wallet, they can store and share documents such as diplomas and licences safely and efficiently. It will provide inter-operability across the union, with signatures and documents recognised by all member states, making it easier to work, study, and travel around the Union.

I led negotiations on this law in the Legal Affairs committee. During negotiations, your privacy was my top priority. One of our key concerns was that Big Tech might take advantage of this system to force citizens to hand over data, or worse yet, governments might use it to spy on citizens or force citizens to use the wallet. In addition, the Commission wanted to introduce a single unique and persistent identifier for each citizen, enabling tracing across the EU.

I ensured that your Digital Wallet remains private. No one, not even the government, can access it without your explicit consent. This puts you in control of your digital identity and privacy.

I advocated for user-friendly features in the Digital Wallet.

I fought to replace the single and unique identifier with a privacy-friendly alternative, guaranteed the right to use pseudonyms, and introduced a simple dashboard. This dashboard allows you to see everyone you’ve shared data with and revoke sharing at the click of a button, making the Digital Wallet easy and intuitive to use.

However, even with solid privacy protection, some citizens may want to avoid using their wallets, and that is okay: it should be up to each citizen to choose how they wish to interact with public services. That is why we introduced an obligation to offer alternative solutions for people who don’t want to use the wallet!

Finally, part of the law posed a risk to the security of the internet. We proposed the deletion of the entire chapter which introduces these rules, to send a strong message in later stages of negotiation. While the final law does not delete the chapter entirely, they made changes to fix the issue. The main problem was that it gave governments the power to tell browsers which they should trust to secure the internet, potentially allowing governments to spy on citizens. 

The final law allows browsers to overrule governments when user security and privacy are at stake and prevents governments from taking control of encryption online, ensuring the internet stays safe and secure for all.